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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
then the issue of devisavit vet non is raised and must go to the superior
court to be tried by a jury.29 Nothing in the opinion conflicts with
the original statement of Chief Justice Ruffin,30 and this intermediate
procedure, standing between probate in common form and formal caveat,
as defined in 1834 and clarified one hundred and eighteen years later,
will bridge the gap confronting persons who seek to get the validity of
a will settled without having to wait for the three year limitations period
on caveats to expire.31 They may now force an early caveat or none
at all, which is the converse of the situation dealt with in Brissic v.
Craig,32 where a prospective caveator was seeking to have the invalidity
of a will settled. In completing the picture of will probates by the
decisions in Brissie v. Craig and the Ellis case, the court has followed
the path of logic with consistency and accuracy, and the way is now
clear for rapid settlement of estates.
HARPER JOHNsTON ELAM, III.
Workmen's Compensation-Right of Employee to Bring Common
Law Action Against Negligent Co-employee
Plaintiff was injured while riding in an automobile driven by the
president of the corporation by which plaintiff was employed. The
plaintiff was awarded compensation under the North Carolina Work-
" In re Will of Ellis, 235 N. C. 27, 32, 69 S. E. 2d 25, 28 (1952). The court
cited as authority N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-273 (1943), which requires the clerk to
transfer cases to superior court when issues of law and fact, or of fact, are raised
before him in civil cases. In view of the constant reiteration by the court of the
proposition that will probates are proceedings in rem, perhaps a stronger basis for
the requirement of a jury trial on the issue of devisavit ,el non is found in the
following language from In re Will of Roediger, 209 N. C. 470, 476, 184 S. E. 74,
77 (1936) : "A trial by jury cannot be waived by the propounder and the caveator.
Nor can they submit to the court an agreed statement of facts, or consent that
the judge may hear the evidence and find the facts determinative of the issue.
The propounder and the caveator are not parties to the proceeding in the sense
that they can by consent relieve the judge of his duty to submit the issue in-
volved in the proceeding to a jury.
"In the instant case, it was error for the judge to render judgment on the facts
agreed upon by the propounder and the caveator, and supplemented by the facts
found by him, with their consent. The proceeding was in ren, and could not be
controlled by the propounder and the caveator, even with the consent and approval
of the judge. In that respect it is distinguishable from a civil action." (Italics
added.) See also In re Will of Morrow, 234 N. C. 365, 67 S. E. 2d 279 (1951).
" Respondents relied on the statement by Chief Justice Ruffin that "if he [the
propounder] take out a decree and summon those in interest against him, 'to see
proceedings,' they are concluded, whether they appear and put in an allegation
against the will or not. .. " The court did not concern itself with this point,
but a reasonable interpretation of this language, and one which would reconcile
it with the holding of the Ellis case, is that it means only that those interested
persons cited are bound by the final disposition of the case, rather than that the
parties are precluded from appealing to the superior court from the decision of
the clerk.
" See REPORT OF THE CoMMIssION ON REVIsIoN OF THE LAWS OF NORTH CARO-
LINA RELATING TO EsTATEs §2 (1939) (where it is suggested this procedure be
provided by statute).
2 See note 22 supra.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
men's Compensation Act. Thereafter he brought a common law action
against the president for negligence. In Warner ,. Leder,' the supreme
court held that the specific language of the Workmen's Compensation
Act prohibited the action.
2
Where an employee who is covered by a Workmen's Compensation
Act is injured as a result of the negligence of a third party, the acts
of most states make some provision for a common law action against
this third person.3 Most acts also provide for subrogation of the em-
ployer or his insurance carrier to the rights of the employee in such
actions. This right of subrogation includes all amounts paid by the
employer or carrier to the employee.
4
In many cases the employee's injury will be due, as in the instant
case, to the negligence of a fellow employee or superior employee in
the organization. When this situation occurs, the question is presented
as to whether this fellow employee or superior employee is a "third
person" within the meaning of the statute allowing suits against third
parties. This situation is covered by statute in many states. Some have
statutes specifically granting immunity to all fellow employees, 5 others
have been judicially construed as doing this even though the wording
1234 N. C. 727, - S. E. 2d- (1952).
' "Every employer .. . or those conducting his business shall only be liable to
any employee who elects to come under the article for personal injury or death
by accident to the extent and in the manner herein specified." (Emphasis added.)
N. C. GEN. STAT. §97-9 (1950).
In the cases of Tscheiller v. National Weaving Co., 214 N. C. 449, 199 S. E.
623 (1938) and McCune v. Rhodes-Rhyne Manufacturing Co., 217 N. C. 351, 8
S. E. 2d 219 (1940) (see note 9 infra) actions by employees against fellow em-
ployees were allowed. G. S. 97-9 was not mentioned in the opinions. The later
cases of Warner v. Leder, 234 N. C. 727, - S. E. 2d - (1952) ; Essick v; Lex-
ington, 232 N. C. 200, 60 S. E. 2d 106 (1950) ; and Bass v. Ingold, 232 N. C.
295, 60 S. E. 2d 114 (1950), relying on G. S. 97-9, modified and limited the
decisions in the two previous cases.
8 See e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §40-1213 (Supp. 1949), Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L.
R. Co. v. Keith, 89 Ind. App. 233, 146 N. E. 872 (1925) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§44-504 (1949), Bittle v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 147 Kan. 227, 75 P. 2d 829
(1938); LA. Rav. STAT. §23:1101 (1950), Lowe v. Morgan's Louisiana & T. R.
& S. S. Co., 150 La. 29, 90 So. 429 (1922) ; N. Y. WoRi. CoMP. LAW §29 (1946),
Caulfield v. Elmhurst Contracting Co., 268 App. Div. 661, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 25
(1945), aff'd, 294 N. Y. 803, 62 N. E. 2d 237 (1945); VA. CODE ANN. §65-38
(1950), Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 65 S. E. 2d 575 (1951). Some acts have
been construed as abolishing actions for damages as against third persons, except
as expressly provided therein. See Note, 106 A. L. R. 1042 (1937). The acts of
New Hampshire, Ohio, and West Virginia contain no provisions relative to em-
ployee or employer remedies against negligent third parties. See generally,
Behrendt, The Rationale of the Election of Remedies Under Workine's Compen-
sation Acts, 12 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 231 (1945).
'See e.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. §97-10 (1950). See Note, 106 A. L. R. 1053
(1937). In some jurisdictions the employer or insurer is held not entitled to
indemnity. See Note, 19 A. L. R. 786 (1922).
8TEx. STAT. REV. Civ. art. 8306, §3 (1941), Grandstaff et al. v. Mercer, 214
S. W. 2d 133 (Tex. 1948) ; AcTs OF THE WEST VIRGINIA LEGISLATuRE c. 136, art.
2, §6-a (1949), reprinted in ScHNEDmE, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION STATUTES
§2516(1) (6-a) (Upkeep service 1950) ; cf. N. Y. WORK. COMP. LAW §29 (1946),
Pantolo v. Lane, 185 Misc. 221, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 227 (1945).
1952]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
does not require such construction,- while others have no such statutes.
Of these latter states the majority hold the fellow employee to be a
third person and amenable to suit,7 while a few grant immunity by
judicial decision.8 There appear to be no decisions dealing specifically
with intentional torts by fellow employees. 9
The "immunity clause" relied upon by the court in the instant case
exempted the employer "and those conducting his business." 10  The
question "was not raised as to whether the defendant (being the presi-
dent of the employer corporation) was "conducting" his employer's busi-
ness. This might be important in some cases, as the generally accepted
definition of "conduct," when so used, would not cover all fellow em-
ployees, but only those in a managerial position. 1 The North Carolina
court has indicated in other cases that the immunity clause will be given
' See e.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. §97-9 (1950), Warner v. Leder, 234 N. C. 727,
- S. E. 2d - (1952) (See note 11, infra.); Oa. ComP. LAWS ANN. §102-1752
(Cum. Supp. 1947), Kowcun v. Bybee, 182 Ore. 271, 186 P. 2d 790 (1947); VA.
CODE ANN. §65-38 (1950), Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S. E. 2d 73 (1946).
The Illinois Act, while not entirely clear, would seem to prohibit a common law
recovery against a fellow servant, but the courts have construed the Act other-
wise and allowed such suits. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 48, §166 (1950), Botthof v.
Fenske, 280 Ill. App. 362 (1935), 7. U. OF CHI. L. Ra,. 362.
'Zimmer v. Casey, 296 Pa. 529, 146 Atl. 130 (1929) (leading case), 15
CORNELL L. Q. 148 (1930); Wells v. Lavitt, 115 Conn. 117, 160 At. 617 (1932);
Echols v. Chatooga Mercantile Co., 74 Ga. App. 18, 38 S. E. 2d 675 (1946);
Kimbro v. Holladay, 154 So. 369 (La. 1934) ; Webster v. Stewart, 210 Mich. 13,
177 N. W. 230 (1920); Behr v. Soth, 170 Minn. 278, 212 N. W. 461 (1927);
Sylcox v. National Lead Co., 225 Mo. App. 543, 38 S. W. 2d 497 (1931); Rehn
v. Bingaman, 151 Neb. 196, 36 N. W. 2d 856 (1949); Churchill v. Stephens, 91
N. J. L. 195, 102 Atl. 657 (1917) ; Hall v. Hill, 158 Misc. 341, 285 N. Y. S. 815
(1936), overruled by Puccio v. Carr, 177 Misc. 706, 31 N. Y. S. 2d 805 (1942) ;
Judson v. Fielding, 227 App. Div. 430, 237 N. Y. S. 348 (1929) (decided prior to
amendment, see note 5 supra); Tawney v. Kirkhart, 130 W. Va. 550, 44 S. E.
2d 634 (1947) (decided prior to amendment, see note 5 supra); McGonigle v.
Gryphan et al., 201 Wis. 269, 229 N. W. 81 (1930).
' Murphy v. Miettinen, 317 Mass. 633, 59 N. E. 2d 252 (1945) ; Rosenberger
v. L'Archer, 31 N. E. 2d 700 (Ohio 1941).
'Cf. McCune v. Rhodes-Rhyne Manufacturing Co., 217 N. C. 351, 8 S. E. 2d
219 (1940) (The court indicated that an employee might maintain a suit against
a fellow employee who wilfully injured him. Later cases have indicated that this
decision is applicable where the injury was inflicted by a superior employee acting
as alter ego of the employer.). Warner v. Leder, 234 N. C. 727, - S. E. 2d -
(1952) ; Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N. C. 200, 60 S. E. 2d 106 (1950). The
fact that an injury is caused by the wilful act of the employer has the effect, in
the majority of jurisdictions, of giving the employee the right to maintain an
action for damages. HoRovITz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION LAWS, 336 (1944); see Note, 68 A. L. R. 301 (1930). From this it
might be concluded that employees in the majority of jurisdictions, at least, would
not be exempted from suit for intentional injury.See note 2 supra.
11 Conduct means to manage; lead; carry on; direct. BLACK'S LAW DIcrIoN-
ARY, 4th ed. (1951); WEBsTR's NEw CoLImEiATz DIcrIONAARY, 2d ed. (1949). It
might be difficult to apply this phrase to a fellow employee who is a ditch digger,
or other common laborer. Thus, if this section be given a restricted interpretation,
those employees who are generally considered to work in a directive capacity,
such as foremen, supervisors, and managers would be protected under the "im-




a "liberal construction," but has not defined its limits.12
However, the court did not rely solely upon the "immunity" statute,
but further justified the decision on another theory. It was noted that
if the injured employee, after receiving compensation, were allowed to
recover from a negligent fellow employee, the employer would be sub-
rogated to the extent of the compensation paid.13' Thus, the burden
of compensation, in such cases, would be shifted from the employer
(and the industry) to the employee. Such result, reasoned the court,
would violate the purpose of the Act.14  Other North Carolina de-
cisions would seem to sustain this theory.' 5
Fundamentally opposed to this reasoning is the argument advanced in
cases where the Workmen's Compensation Act contains no such immun-
ity clause. These courts state that the Compensation Law does not
specifically relieve a fellow employee of his liability in tort and since
there is no contractual relation between the two employees there is no
reason for exempting one employee from liability for his torts against
another employee.' 0
A great deal of sympathy must be accorded the idea that it was the
intention of the legislature to have industry shoulder the burden of in-
dustrial accidents. Both the employee and employer make concessions
under the Act, and while the employee gains more security, the com-
pensation is often much less than might be recovered in a common law
suit.
17
Legislation might effectuate a compromise of two divergent views and
still allow an employee adequate legal redress for his injuries. This could
be done as follows: repeal any immunity clause pertaining to fellow
employees and specifically provide for suit against any employee causing
injury to his fellow employee; preclude an employer or his insurance
carrier from subrogation to any rights an employee might have against
his fellow employee; require the injured employee to exhaust his rem-
1 2Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N. C. 200, 210, 60 S. E. 2d 106, 113 (1950).
" See note 4 supra.
234 N. C. at 733, -S. E. 2d -.
Z "The philosophy which supports the Workmen's Compensation Act is 'that
the wear and tear of human beings in modem industry should be charged to the
Industry just as the wear and tear of machinery has always been charged. And
while such compensation is presumably charged to the industry, and consequently
to the employer or owner of the industry, eventually it becomes a part of the fair
money cost of the industrial product, to be paid for by the general public patroniz-
ing such products.' Cox v. Kansas City Refining Co., 108 Kan. 320, 195 P. 863
(1921)." Vause v. Vause Farm Equipment Co., 233 N. C. 88, 92, 63 S. E. 2d
173, 176 (1951). Accord: Chambers v. Union Oil Co., 199 N. C. 28, 31, 153
S. E. 2d 594, 596 (1930).
" Kimbro v. Holladay, 154 So. 369, 370 (La. 1934) ; Sylcox v. National Lead
Co., 225 Mo. App. 543, 38 S. W. 2d 497 (1931) ; Zimmer v. Casey, 296 Pa. 529,
146 Atl: 130 (1929).
" For example, in Warner v. Leder, the recovery in the lower court was
$40,000. See A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1951, 29 N. C.
L. REv. 351, 428 (1951).
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edies under the Act before this right may be exercised; deduct any
compensation recovered under the Act from the judgment recovered in
the common law suit ;18 pay the balance to the injured employee. The
employee would thus recover full damages for his injury without
receiving a double recovery. 19 The spirit of the Act would not be
violated, for industry would be shouldering the burden of industrial
accidents to the extent that the legislature contemplated.20  The co-
employee's common law liability would be relieved to the extent that the
employer was liable for compensation. However, any attempted statu-
tory amendments, unless drawn with extreme care, might foster in-
equitable situations.21
CHARLEs F. LAMBETE, JR.
Wrongful Death Action-Recovery for Breach of Warranty-
Ex Delicto-Ex Contractu Distinction
Plaintiff executrix brought an action for wrongful death based upon
breach of warranty of fitness on the part of defendant retailer in the
sale of a drug to plaintiff's intestate. In a 4 to 3 decision," the Florida
Supreme Court ruled that the wrongful death statute of that state2
18 In the present North Carolina Act, the amotmt of compensation paid by the
employer, or the amount of compensation to which the. injured employee or his
dependents are entitled, shall not be admissible as evidence in any action against a
third party. N. C. GEN. STAT. §97-10 (1950).
" Double recoveries occur where employees receive compensation under the
Act and also recover at common, law for the same injury. See Behrendt, The
Rationale of the Election of Remedies Under Workmen's Compensation Acts, 12
U. OF CHr. L. REv. 231, 238 (1945).
" Industry (through the employer) would pay the compensation required by
law and would be unable to recover this amount by subrogation.
1 Suppose the foll6wing situation occurred: Employer and fellow employee
(E 2 ) are each 50% negligent in causing the injury of plaintiff employee (El).
El receives $8,000 under the Act from the employer. Total damages to E1, as
assessed by a jury in a suit by El v. E2 , amount to $50,000. As tortfeasors are
jointly and severally liable for their torts in North Carolina (Cunningham v.
Haynes, 214 N. C. 456, 199 S. E. 627 (1938)), El could collect from E2 full
damages ($50,000) minus the $8,000 already received. E 2 could not have joined,
nor would he have a right over against the employer, as would normally be true
in the case of joint tortfeasors under N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-240 (1943). The in-
justice of this is apparent. To take care of this situation it would be necessary
to enact a proviso to the effect thaf'in cases of joint negligence on the part of a
co-employee and an employer, the co-employee shall only be liable to the extent
of his own negligence.
Again, suppose co-employees Ei and E2 are both injured in the course of their
employment due to the negligence of E2. Both receive $8,000 under the Act. Et
is damaged to the extent of $16,000. Thereafter Ei sues and recovers an addi-
tional $8,000 from E2.. Here we have an injured employee who receives nothing
under the Act because he was negligent, though the Act relieves negligence as a
bar to compensation. Is this an unduly harsh result, quaere?
1Whiteley v. Webb's City; Inc., 55 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1951) (defendant retailer
sold to plaintiff's intestate a drug known as "Westsal" which was to be used as
a salt substitute, and -the complaint alleged' the use of this drug caused the death
of intestate). ' . 'I FLA. STAT. A'. §768.01 (1949). ,'I ,
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